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If the curriculum were radically simplified, if the teacher's 
mission were squarely defined as making everyone master 
every bit of it, and if children were allowed to learn at their 
own pace, by repeating if necessary, the vast majority of 
children would get something from the years they spend in 
school. 
Banerjee and Duflo, Poor Economics (2011) 
The expansion in schooling around the world is one of the amazing successes of our time. 
More children are in school, longer, and completing more grades that ever before in history. 
The average years of schooling of the labor force in the developing world more than tripled 
from 1950 to 2010--from 2.0 to 7.2 years (Barro & Lee, 2011). The average worker in 
Bangladesh in 2010 completed more years of schooling than the typical worker in France in 
1975. While the world may miss reaching the Millennium Development Goal of universal 
primary school completion by 2015—it won’t be by much.1 However, as the world nears a 
schooling goal, there is rising concern this expansion might not coincide with education or 
learning goals (Filmer, Hasan, & Pritchett, 2007) . There is cumulating evidence that the 
learning profile—the relationship between years of schooling and measures of student 
mastery—is far too flat.2 Children are learning so little from each year of instruction that the 
completion of even basic schooling leaves children lacking necessary skills. Thus, some 
development and education organizations are reorienting their programming and goals from 
schooling to learning.3 As they do so a key question is why there is so little learning and what 
can be done about it. 
The puzzle of flat learning profiles 
Many studies start from an assessment of student learning tested in a given grade and hence 
start from the level of student achievement. But every student’s level of mastery is the just the 
accumulation of their lifetime learning. Once one begins to investigate the dynamics  of 
learning in developing countries the immediate question is: “how can it possibly be that so 
many children are learning so very little during a year’s worth of schooling?” 
Three examples of learning profiles from India 
The Andhra Pradesh Randomized Evaluation Study (APRESt), a large and sophisticated 
experimental study of the impact of educational practices on learning, is ongoing in four 
districts of Andhra Pradesh, India. Because one goal of the study is to track learning 
progress across grades, the same questions are asked of the approximately 100,000 children in 
                                                      
1 Only 19 countries are unlikely to meet the primary completion goal, and 13 countries are off track from 
meeting the primary school gender parity goal by 2015 (World Bank, 2011). 
2 The learning profile is a purely descriptive graphic device—there is no implication of causation. 
3 E.g. the World Bank’s 2020 sector strategy and DFID’s 2010 strategy are learning for all, USAID’s strategy is 
opportunity through learning, and AusAid is also adopting learning goals.   
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grades 2 to 5. Figure 1 shows the grade learning profile, the fraction of children in each 
grade who answer correctly, for four selected items involving simple arithmetic operations4.  
Even for the most mechanical arithmetic operations there is amazingly slow progress from 
second to fifth grade. For a “level two” competency like “two digit addition without carry” 
40 percent of children in grade 2 answer correctly and yet only 70 percent answer correctly 
by grade 5. This means that of the 60 percent of children who did not already master 
addition by grade 2 less than half gained the skill in three full years of additional schooling. There 
are three of every ten children who enrolled school, stayed in school until grade 5, and never 
learned even the simplest addition. 
Figure 1: Learning profiles from Andhra Pradesh, India demonstrate only a minority 
of children learn basic addition skills between grades 2 and 5 
 
Source: APRESt data provided by Karthik Muralidharan 
Moreover, the results are even worse when one looks at conceptual learning. Fewer children 
could add 9+8 than 32+21, as “carry” requires some knowledge of place. While half of 
students could correctly add three digit numbers when presented in a mechanical fashion 
(but only half) but few could use that skill to answer the simple question that required 
rearranging addition. Less than 10 percent could answer: 200+85+400=600+___.  
A second estimate of a learning profile comes from Educational Initiatives (EI) (2010), 
which tests students’ conceptual understanding. EI’s study covered in-school children in 
grades 4, 6 and 8, in government schools in 18 states in India, representing about 74 percent 
                                                      
4 This is not tracking the learning dynamics of individual students but is the description of performance of 
students across grades.  
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of the Indian population (urban and rural). EI asked a common set of three questions in the 
same grades in language and mathematics. For the language questions (e.g., adding a word to 
complete a sentence), the percent correct only increased from 51 percent to 57 percent from 
grades 4 to 8. In math, the average percent correct went up by only 7.1 percentage points per 
year. 
As with the APRESt results, EI found that even this progress in some ways overstates the 
learning gains because students perform much better on mechanical than conceptual skills. 
For example answering a question like 43x2 (written vertically) was much easier for 4th 
graders, 67 percent of whom answered correctly, than a question that asks 3 x ? = 3+3+3+3 
(solving for the question mark), which only 30 percent of students answered correctly. Even 
though the multiplication required is much easier, the question as posed requires conceptual 
understanding that multiplication is repeated addition.  
The Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) testing methods and reporting process were 
developed and administered by the Indian education NGO Pratham and more recently by 
the ASER Centre. (So ASER is the name of the organization that administers tests and 
produces results, the name of its test, and the name of its report showcasing test results.) 
This testing exercise is valuable because it is large-scale (over 500,000 children tested), 
carried out across India each year, and it tests all children, not just those in school. This 
child-based information can be used to construct a learning profile by self-reported grade 
completed. By grade 5 (the end of primary school), only 1 in 5 children in Uttar Pradesh in 
2007 could do a simple division problem (one digit into three digits), and only 40 percent 
could read a text at the “grade 2” level. Even by grade 8, only about 50 percent of students 
could do the simple division problem, and just above 70 percent could read a grade 2 text. 
Almost three in ten students who have persisted through eight years of schooling still cannot 
read a simple paragraph (ASER, 2008).  
4 
 
Figure 2: Learning profiles from Uttar Pradesh, India demonstrate that only 75-80 
percent of children persisting thought eight years of schooling achieve basic reading 
and mathematics skills 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations with ASER 2008 data  
Even most studies that are able to give learning profiles are synthetic in that they compare 
not the same children over time but children in different grades. One very recent study 
Bhattacharjea, Wadhwa and Banerji 2001) tracked roughly 22,000 children across grades 
(grade 2 to grade 3 and grade 4 to grade 5) testing them in a set of language and 
mathematical capabilities. This shows the learning gains of actual children as they moved 
from grade to grade. This study also shows very slow progress. For instance 41.4 percent of 
children could write a dictated word in grade 2 and only 54.7 percent could do so in grade 3. 
As usual, there are huge variations across states. In Himachal Pradesh the number of 
children who could do a word problem involving one digit increased from 12.1 percent to 
22.9 percent. In Rajasthan this increased from 7.1 to only 9.6 percent—an only 2.5 
percentage point increase—and in Jharkhand the proportion actually fell from 14.8 percent in 
grade 2 to only 11.0 percent when the same children were tested in grade 3. On average, 
across the 11 items in mathematics asked (all relatively simple numerical or word problems) 
the percent of gain as a fraction of those who did not already know was only 12.7 percent, 
implying seven of eight children made no progress on the questions asked.  
Table 1 illustrates learning progress per year of schooling using selected questions from these 
three studies. Different studies employing different strategies to measure different 
components of mathematics skill consistently demonstrate that there is just a 3 to 12 
percentage point increase in student mastery of basic mathematics per year. The last column 
shows the percent of students who learned to answer the question in a typical additional year 
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of instruction.5 This ranges from only 4 percent (on the conceptual question of 
measurement) to 20 percent (on doing division).  
Table 1: Studies across India demonstrate very little conceptual or procedural 
mathematics learning as children progress through school 
  Skill/competency  
(examples from each 
assessment) 
Average 
percentage 
point increase 
per year of 
schooling  
Of students who 
didn’t know skill, 
percent who learned 
in the next grade 
APRESt (four 
districts of Andhra 
Pradesh) 
Vertical single digit addition 
(w carry) 
10.0 17.6 
Identify which shape is a 
triangle  
5.3 7.0
11 common questions, 
grades 2 to 5
6.1 9.4 (≈ 1 in 11) 
ASER (nationwide, 
rural) 
Division (3 digit by 1 
digit), grades 2 to 8
9.0 12.6 (≈1 in 8) 
Reading grade 2 story, 
grades 2 to 8 
11.8 
 
21.8 (≈1 in 5) 
ASER (five states, 
rural) 
11 questions in 
mathematics (numerical 
and word problems), 
from grade 4 to 5
9.5 12.7 (≈1 in 8) 
Education Initiatives 
(18 states) 
 
19+X=32 7.5 16.9 
Measuring length with ruler 
(when object is placed at 
1cm)6  
2.9 3.9
All items asked across 
grades (4 and 6, 6 and 8, 
or 4,6 and 8)
4.9 8.5 ( ≈1 in 12) 
Sources and notes: APRESt: four districts in Andhra Pradesh. Average yearly gain from grades 
2-5. 
ASER nationwide: 2012. Grades 2-8. Sample is every district in India, 30 villages per district 
and 20 households per village. Average yearly gain grades 2-8 since division and reading are 
grade 2 competencies as stipulated by the national curriculum. 
ASER five-state (Assam, Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Rajasthan) report 
by Bhattacharjea, Wadhwa, and Banerji (2011) follows the same children across grades. 
Sample is three districts per state, 60 government primary schools per district.  
EI: 18-state average for grades 4, 6, 8 with grades 5 and 7 imputed.
                                                      
5 Again, this is the net gain not tracking of individual students so does not capture the “churn” in the 
learning and forgetting of individual students. 
6 One remarkable finding regarding this question is that ASER used it in a five-state study, yet for teachers. 
Only 82 percent of teachers willing to participate in the testing were able to answer this correctly. See 
Bhattacharjea, Wadhwa and Banerji 2011.  
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Looking at all questions for which we have learning profiles from the three studies, we find 
that the learning, measured as the net addition in percent correct, is only about 8 to 22 
percent per year. That is, of children lacking the ability to answer these simple curricular-
based questions going into a typical grade, only about 1 in 8 demonstrate that skill after an 
additional year of schooling. This means that seven out of eight children made no progress on a 
typical item after an entire year of schooling. Even at best, with the simplest skills like reading 
a simple passage, four out of five children who go into a grade not able to read will finish the 
grade still unable to read. 
These numbers are shocking. How can learning profiles be so flat? What is going on inside 
the classroom such that nearly all students who cannot read going into grade 4 don’t learn to 
read while in grade 4? How can a child sit through an entire year of schooling not knowing 
how to do simple addition and not learn to add? What is going on in the schooling process 
that children can spend thousands of hours in school and yet not master even the basic 
competencies? 
Learning profiles and cumulative achievement in the developing world 
This problem of a flat learning profile is not unique to India. Several other countries have 
implemented ASER-like instruments to measure what fraction of children can do division or 
read a simple level 2 passage. Thus these countries implemented nearly identical tests and 
found the fraction who learn the expected skills in grades 2 to 5 is similarly low—only about 
8 to 34 percent of those who don’t have the skill gain it in a year of instruction between 
grades 2 and 5. 
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Table 2: Similar assessments around the world show similarly flat learning profiles 
Country  Average percentage point increase 
per year of schooling, grades 2-5  
Of students who didn’t know skill, 
percent who learned in the next grade, 
grades 2-5 
Reading (grade 2 story) 
India  13.2  17.1
Pakistan  14.1  18.7
Tanzania  14.8  21.5
Uganda (English)  7.7  8.2
Kenya  20.4  34.1
Division (one digit into three digits)
India  8.3  9.3
Pakistan  9.9  11.6
Uganda  11.3  14.4
Kenya  18.6  28.4
Sources: Uwezo Tanzania 2011, Uwezo Uganda 2010, Uwezo Kenya 2011, ASER Pakistan 2011, ASER 
India 2012 
Notes: Tests in Tanzania and Kenya were in Kiswahili, and in Uganda, English. India tests were in local 
languages, and Pakistan in Urdu or Sindhi. All tests used the ASER standard of being able to read a grade 
2-level text as the highest level of reading comprehension, with the exception of Uganda, which used 
being able to read and understand a grade 2-level text, as distinct from just being able to read, as the highest 
level of competency measure. Understanding requires correctly answering comprehension questions 
about the text. Table above reflects Uganda results for comprehension. For division, Uganda reports 
“ability to solve at least two numerical written down division sums of P2 difficulty.” Uwezo Tanzania did 
not test division.  
 
Asking the same questions of children in different years of schooling to estimate the learning 
profile is relatively rare. Most empirical studies compare learning achievement of students by 
testing a single cross-section of students (by grade or age). But cumulative attainment is just 
the result of a life-long learning profile as the skills at any age or grade are the result of a 
child’s initial endowment of capabilities, early childhood nutrition and care and experiences, 
and his/her lifetime of learning experiences, both in and out of school. Therefore low 
attainment of children who have completed schooling is just the cumulative result of a 
shallow learning profile. 
Figure 3 illustrates such progression by comparing the (estimated) entire distribution of 
student performance in a typical OECD country, Denmark, with a typically scoring 
developing country, Indonesia. Seeing the entire distribution of student performance shows 
two main points.  
  The difference between the “average” student in the two countries is around 100 
points, which is massive and equates to 1.25 student standard deviations in 
Indonesian test scores.   
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  This difference in the entire distribution of performance implies that the majority of 
students in Indonesia are below a low threshold of learning. PISA established five 
“levels” of learning, and in reading, 58 percent of Indonesian students are below the 
most basic level, compared to only 16 percent of Danish students. The educational 
quality problem is not a problem of marginalized or a subset of students in 
Indonesia – it is a problem of the majority.  
 
Figure 3: There are massive differences in learning between typical developed and 
developing countries: a majority of Indonesian students are below an international 
benchmark in reading 
  
Source: PISA 2006 country means, standard deviations, and fractions below levels I are from 
http://pisacountry.acer.edu.au. Graphs are generated by simulating a normal distribution of 
results from the reported means and standard deviations. 
When two countries end up with very different performances at age 15 it is either (a) due to 
a difference in the initial distribution of knowledge/skill; (b) due to the learning profile of a 
cohort; or (c) both. Figure 3 just shows that the cross-national comparison at a point in time 
(age 15 or grade 8) is a slice through an ongoing learning dynamic for each student. In Figure 
4 we depict scenario (b): Indonesian and Danish students started out with the same initial 
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knowledge or skill, but Indonesian students diverged to end up with much lower assessed 
performance in grade 8 (or age 15) due to a flatter learning profile.  
 
Source: Authors’ simulations to fit actual distributions assuming equal starting distribution, 
using PISA 2006 from http://pisacountry.acer.edu.au.  
Therefore the shallow learning profiles observed directly in the India studies are consistent 
with the very low average performance observed in countries from Latin America to South 
Asia to Africa to parts of Asia. Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) have combined all the 
available international tests into an estimate of “cognitive skills,” summarized in Figure 5. 
The “typical” developing country (labeled “Dev”) is around 400, the weaker countries are in 
the 300s (two standard deviations below the OECD average (by construction) of 500, and 
even the best developing country is well below the OECD mean and about equivalent to the 
worst high-performing east Asian (HPEA) country. A priority research question is why 
cumulative learning outcomes are so low and what can be done about it.  
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The gap between the learning and curricular pace 
  “…the teacher still feels accountable for completing the 
prescribed syllabus…. Children who fall behind stay behind stay 
behind as the rest of the class moves ahead. Most primary school 
teachers take the least risky route of concentrating on those children 
who…can cope with the syllabus.” 
Rukmini Banerji, 2000 
We believe we can make progress on the puzzle of why learning profiles are so flat by 
standing the problem as usually posed on its head. The usual question is “why are students 
so far behind the curriculum?” but the more telling question is “why is the curriculum so far 
ahead of the students?”7  
 
                                                      
7 Throughout the paper we use the term curriculum to broadly describe what teachers are instructed or 
mandated to teach, what they plan to teach, and what they actually do in the classroom. The problems we 
describe might not only be due to teachers following a prescribed curriculum but, also due to any combination of 
curricula, syllabi, lesson plans or instruction. We recognize that even if teachers are incentivized and instructed to 
teach an overambitious curriculum, they may not do so in practice; or that they may be guided to employ 
“student-centered learning” yet still adhere to the guidelines of the system’s curriculum or lesson plans. Our main 
point is that the level of instruction is overambitious relative to student skill, irrespective of who is driving the 
parameters of instruction – curriculum is just shorthand for this level of instruction.      
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Curriculum mismatches around the world 
In many of the same countries described above with appallingly low levels of learning, we 
also see students lagging behind curricular expectations. For example, according to the 
curriculum, Pakistani students are expected to master single digit addition by kindergarten or 
at latest first grade. But the Learning and Educational Attainment in Punjab Schools 
(LEAPS) study in Pakistan found only 65 percent of third graders in Punjab, Pakistan could 
perform single digit addition (Das, Pandey, & Zajonc, 2006). By third grade, the Pakistani 
curriculum expects children to be able to add fractions, a task that requires both mastery of 
addition and multiplication and the more sophisticated understanding of “common 
denominator.” Not surprisingly, only 19 percent of third grade students could add fractions. 
The LEAPS study reports: “typically, children are three to four grade-levels below the 
curriculum”. This means if teachers are teaching the curriculum, they are using material 
“three and four grade levels” above the ability of their students.  
Similar results were found in India. Even in one of India’s highest achieving states, Himachal 
Pradesh, in reading, nearly only a third of students starting grade 3 were able to perform 
what was expected of them by the end of grade 1. Rajasthan is one of the lower performing 
states in a five-state study by ASER, yet the expectations of the curriculum are even higher 
than in Himachal Pradesh. In Rajasthan, the curriculum specifies that in grade 1, children are 
supposed to be able to read a chapter written in story form, yet by the end of grade 3, less 
than 40 percent of students were able to read even simple two letter words (Bhattacharjea, 
Wadhwa, & Banerji, 2011). 
Table 3 compares actual achievement with what students are expected to learn in the 
curriculum. The Indian government has set “minimum learning levels” (MLLs) in each 
subject (and this is supposedly a “minimum” standard). In mathematics, there are five 
learning areas: 1) whole numbers and numerals, 2) adding, subtracting, multiplying and 
dividing whole numbers, 3) simple problems of daily life relating to units of money, length, 
mass (weight), capacity, area and time, 4) fractions, decimals and percentage, and 5) 
geometrical shapes and spatial relationships.8 Each MLL competency area has multiple items 
by grade level. In grade 5 there are 14 separate items in the category “ability to use fractions, 
decimals and percentage.”  
The gap between the actual student abilities in rural Andhra Pradesh and the “minimal” 
expectations of the curriculum could not be more stark. Less than half of children can say 
that the figure is 1/4th shaded, only a quarter can multiply a simple fraction by a whole 
number, and less than 1 in 10 can understand a sentence with a fraction in it. Yet the 
curriculum expects, at a “minimum,” that children do percentages, multiply and divide 
fractions, do problems with length, weight, etc, and. using decimals. And these are only the 
14 items expected in one learning area.  
                                                      
8 See http://www.education.nic.in/cd50years/r/2S/99/2S990401.htm  
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school; children who have attended school regularly are automatically promoted to the next 
grade, regardless the level of learning.…As a result, the number of children who need extra 
help and attention to stay at grade level continues to grow as the children move through 
primary school…Without serious and committed remedial help at school, the children who 
begin to lag behind just get further behind and can never really catch up.” As we will 
highlight in section III, the NGO Pratham in India for instance has designed interventions 
like Read India to remediate these deficiencies.  
Education experts consistently point out that many countries curriculum are wildly 
overambitious in terms of both coverage and pace (Piper, 2009; Crouch & Korda, 2009; 
Korda & Piper , 2011; World Bank, 2005; Bhattacharjea, Wadhwa, & Banerji, 2011; Dubeck, 
Jukes, & Okello, 2012) . 
If the official school curriculum covers too much, goes too fast and is too hard compared to 
the initial skill of the students and the ability of the schools to teach this can produce 
disastrous results. An overambitious curriculum causes more and more students get left 
behind early and stay behind forever. If children do not acquire reading and writing skills 
early, then textually based teaching in higher grades is pointless.9 If children don’t acquire 
simple arithmetic concepts—like place and common denominator—then more sophisticated 
operations like adding fractions is impossible. If children don’t acquire basic reasoning 
skills—like filling in a word to complete a meaningful sentence--then asking for creativity or 
critical analysis later is impossible. This is how it can be that children enter—and leave—
third grade without being able to read or to do addition: the curriculum has moved on. 
Modeling the mismatch 
In this section we construct a simple simulation model of student learning, instruction and 
grade progression, illustrating the consequences of a gap between learning potential and 
curricular pace, which we call the curricular gap. This simulation model shows that a divide 
between the pace of learning—the increment to student skills from year to year – and the 
curricular pace can, in and of itself, cause a flat learning profile. That is, we use a simple 
simulation model to illustrate that two countries, both of which start with exactly the same 
initial student ability and exactly the same potential  learning can end up with completely 
different cumulative learning achievement—and that it is the country that tries to go too fast 
that ends up far behind. Our simple simulations show that curricular gaps alone can generate 
the entire observed cross-national variation in grade 8 observed outcomes in tests like 
TIMSS or PISA that ranges from 300 to 500—even under the assumption that all countries 
having exactly the same initial level of student ability and the same potential learning function.  
As a method of investigation, a simulation model does not prove anything, but has four 
advantages. First, by building a simple artificial world we know completely and precisely how 
                                                      
9 For example, even in the USA, a study finds that students who aren’t reading proficiently by grade 3 are 
four times more likely than proficient readers to drop out before finishing grade 12 (Hernandez, 2011).  
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that artificial world it works, what causes what, and how—something that is never true of 
real world observation or experiment. Second, a simulation can tease out the magnitudes: 
how big can effects possibly (even plausibly) be. Third, simulations illustrate what can cause 
what. Finally, a simulation that can with parsimonious inputs generate a range of results, can 
show how seemingly disparate empirical phenomena—like large effects of remediation, early 
drop-out, equivalence of contract with regular teachers, positive impacts from tracking—all 
could be results of the same underlying cause. 
A simple simulation model of learning and curricular pace 
In order to build a simulation model of school instruction and learning, we first construct a 
potential pedagogical function (PPF). Think of any instructional experience, whether it is a tennis 
lesson, a piano lesson, a lecture on quantum physics, learning addition in second grade, or a 
film on Greek history. A student enters an instructional episode with a given skill set or 
capability in a set of domains. How much does a student actually learn—that is, expand his 
capability set--from an instructional episode?  
To minimally characterize a given student’s learning from an instructional episode we need 
four elements.  
First, what is the maximum gain of any student, which is the height of the pedagogical function. 
The main difference between our simulation and most of the existing literature is that 
explicitly or implicitly most of the empirical assumes that this is the only relevant 
characteristic of a PPF. That is, they assume either (a) that all children who share an 
instructional experience (e.g. in the same school, in the same classroom, exposed to the same 
teacher) learn the same amount or (b) that child learning is specific to the child due to some 
underlying ability to learn like a general measure of “intelligence.” This is illustrated in Figure 
6a. 
However, common sense tells us that a one parameter (height only, like in Figure 6a) PPF 
cannot be right. Instruction can be either too easy or too hard. Take a lecture on quantum 
physics. If the lecture is centered on cutting edge research, then a graduate student might 
benefit, an undergraduate in physics might benefit a small amount, and we (the authors) 
would not get anything out of it at all, lacking the background in math or physics. In 
contrast, a lecture geared to a general audience would benefit us, but benefit a graduate 
student less and bore a professor. More prosaically think of piano lessons. Instruction on 
reading notes (Every Good Boy Does Fine and all that) benefits the beginner but not the 
virtuoso and a master class on the appropriate dynamics of the Moonlight Sonata refines the 
virtuoso but hardly benefits a child who cannot read the notes.10  
                                                      
10 Or benefit, much to our mothers’ disappointment, the authors.  
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The second feature of a PPF is the shape. Does learning fall off symmetrically and linearly 
from a unique maximum? The PPF would be triangular (Figure 6b). Does every child learn 
the same within a range but outside that range children learning nothing? The PPF would be 
rectangular (Figure 6c). Doe learning decline exponentially from the maximum? The PPF 
could have a “normal” distribution (Figure 6d). There is no reason the shape need be 
symmetric and learning could decline more sharply for those above than below the 
maximum (Figure 6e).  
Third is the range of the pedagogical function (determined by the height and shape) which is 
the extent of the student skill over which the student learns, or the spectrum of skills over 
which episodes are applicable or relevant and allow for learning. Below we also refer to this 
as the width.  
Fourth, with a “height only” PPF (as in Figure 6a) location is irrelevant, but with a PPF with 
a shape the location matters. To what level of student ability or capability is the instruction 
pitched. Particularly for any symmetric representation we can refer to the level of student 
ability on which the PPF is centered.  
To be fair, most educational researchers did not assume that a “height only” PPF really had 
infinite extent. Rather they assumed (implicitly usually) that “height only” was a useful 
approximation because (a) instruction was centered, (b) the shape was quite flat and/or (c) 
the range of the PPF was large relative to the distribution of student initial capability. The 
very design of schooling into grades with a sequenced curriculum is intended to reproduce 
those conditions to achieve cost efficiency so that students can be taught in large(ish) 
groups. We illustrate the consequences for learning if instruction is not centered on actual 
student ability and the range of student ability is large.   
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Figure 6: Illustrations of possible shapes of potential pedagogical functions (PPFs) 
demonstrate pace and range of student learning  
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6a: A one-parameter PPF
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Source: Authors’ simulations 
In our subsequent simulations, we use symmetric triangular potential pedagogical functions 
because this makes the math of the simulations easy (learning declines linearly away from the 
maximum) and makes the graphs easier to interpret (because PPFs will be triangles and 
distributions of student learning will start out as a “normal” distribution). We are not 
asserting the pedagogical functions are in fact triangular and nothing about the main findings 
of our simulations hinges on using this particular shape of the PPF.  
Actual student learning is the interaction of the PPF with the initial distribution of student 
skill. The learning of any particular student “i” of initial skill level “si” is expressed in a 
simple piece-wise linear equation that is a function of three parameters of the triangular PPF: 
“c” (the center in the skills dimension), “m” (the maximum of the PPF, or in this case the 
height of the triangle, which is at c), and “r” the range. 
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This implies that average learning of any group of students from exposure to the same PPF 
depends on the gap between the center of the PPF and the center of the distribution of 
student skill. This is illustrated in figures 7a and 7b, and in table 4. 
Figure 7a shows the interaction of normal distribution of student skills and a triangular PPF 
centered on the mean of student skills of 340. We have calibrated the PPF and initial 
distribution in PISA/TIMSS units of OECD mean 500 and student standard deviation 100, 
so that centered curriculum reproduces (roughly) the PISA/TIMSS means and standard 
deviations.  
When the PPF(66,ST,330,340) is centered on a assumed student ability of N(340,20) then 
children across the range of abilities all learn, but somewhat different amounts. (340 is 
roughly the mean for grade 5 students, using the PISA/TIMSS calibration discussed above.) 
Students two standard deviations above or below the mean, student A at 300 or student E at 
380, learn 50—so that after the year of instruction they are at 350 and 430. The student at 
the mean learns 66 and so will emerge at 406.  
Table 4: Shifting the center of instruction (the skill level of the student who learns the 
most) away from the center of the actual distribution of student skill lowers learning 
gains, particularly for lagging students 
Student   Hypothetical 
distribution of initial 
student ability, mean 
340, std. dev. 20  
Learning gain 
when instruction is 
centered on actual 
student mean (340)
Learning gain 
when instruction 
is centered on 
higher level than 
actual student 
average (460) 
A (average less two 
std. dev)  300  50  2 
B (average less one 
std. dev)  320  58  10 
C (average)  340   66  18 
D (average plus one 
std. dev.)  360  58  26 
E (average plus two 
std. dev.)  380  50  34 
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Figure 7b illustrates that students with exactly the same initial ability, exposed to an 
overambitious curriculum centered on a student of skill 460--PPF(66,ST,330,460), will learn 
less as the material is too hard. Student A now learns next to nothing at all (2 units) and even 
the average student, C, learns only 18 units, compared to the potential of 66 if instruction 
were centered on her ability.  
Figure 7: Identical distributions of student skill can result in very different learning 
outcomes, depending on where the level of instruction is centered  
 
Source: Authors’ imagination 
Schooling is a sequence of instructional episodes. Let us treat a “year of schooling” as 
instructional episode on a single dimension of “skill.” A school curriculum specifies what is 
to be taught in various grades. This implies a pace with which the curriculum moves through 
the material—how well students are expected to read and write, what arithmetic or 
mathematical skills they should conceptually master, what they should understand about the 
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natural world, how their critical thinking skills should progress.11 (Curricular goals also 
include other dimensions like values, practices, attitudes which are also an integral part of 
schooling goals.)  
A faster curricular pace means the PPFs for various grades move more rapidly ahead in the 
skill levels. Figure 8 shows two scenarios with two different curricular paces. Scenario 8a 
demonstrates that with a pace of 60, the ‘distance’ between the grade 1 and grade 5 is 240 
points, meaning that the curriculum expects to shift learning by 240 points between these 
grades; whereas 8b has a pace of 90 and 360 point difference between grade 1 and grade 5.  
Figure 8: Different curricula have different levels of expected learning or paces from 
grade to grade  
  
 
Source: Authors’ imagination 
Here is the first and essentially only tricky thing to understand in this paper. The curricular 
pace is a policy determined shift in the skill around which the official instruction is centered. 
                                                      
11 Throughout these simulations, we assume that students move uniformly through grades, or automatic 
promotion.  
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Graphically this is the horizontal displacement of the PPF from year to year. The interaction of 
the PPF and initial student skill describes how much the skill of each student actually moves 
from year to year. This is the horizontal displacement of actual student skill, or, in a graph 
with grades on the horizontal axis and learning on the vertical this is the learning profile.  
Because the curricular pace is a policy  decision there is no intrinsic connection between 
curricular pace and actual pace. The curricular pace can be slower or faster than the PPF 
determined actual pace.  
Results with our simulation model of learning 
Our simulation model has just these three elements:  
  a potential pedagogical function (PPF) that specifies student learning per grade for 
each student (in our simulations, the function is symmetric and triangular), 
  a curricular pace that specifies how far the PPF shifts from grade to grade, 
  an initial normal distribution of student skill in grade 1. 
With those elements we can simulate the trajectory of skills of each individual student and 
hence, by simulating the learning trajectories of a large number of individual students, we 
can generate the evolution of the distribution of skill across a population of students through 
the entire course of basic education from grade 1 to grade 8.  
Our first goal is to show the consequences in this simulated world of different choices for 
curricular pace. The parameters of the simulation are chosen such that centered instruction—
defined as a match between the curricular pace and the actual learning pace—moves the 
average student performance from 100 in grade 1 to 500 in grade 8, and produces a standard 
deviation in grade 8 equal to those empirically observed for a typical OECD country, say 
Denmark. The PPF in Figure 9a with maximum height of 66 points gained per year, total 
width/range of 330 (five times height) and triangular shape, generates an average gain in 
grade 1 of 60 points a year, when initial student skill is normally distributed around a mean 
of 100 with a standard deviation of 20. With this PPF and a curricular pace of 60 (equal to 
the first year’s actual gain), this simulation generates a grade 8 learning profile similar to an 
OECD country.12 The equation for the PPF for grade N with height, shape, with, and center 
is: 
  .2 	           66,  ,330,100      1   ∗     
                                                      
12 The principal limitation of the simple simulation with a symmetric triangular PPF is that it generates a 
“standard deviation” that is similar to Denmark’s but not the “normal” looking distribution empirically observed.  
Rather, given the mechanics of the learning specified in which more advanced students regress to the mean, the 
resulting distribution is concentrated near the average, but with a long left-tail of students who are gradually left 
behind.  The result is a very “non-normal” shape as there is skewness with a long-left tail.  We think we can fix 
this without sacrificing other features of the simulation (say, by using a asymmetric triangle or introducing 
“student ability”) but have not yet done so.  
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The results displayed in Figure 9b are based on exactly the same simulation with just one 
change—the curricular pace has increased to 100. That is, the center of the PPF now moves 
ahead in the skill dimension by 100 points each year. One might think that making the 
curriculum more ambitious could only lead to good things, but in this simulation it is 
disastrous. The average score of students in grade 8 falls from 500 to only 247. Exactly the 
same PPF that generated average scores of 500 also generates scores of grade 8 students 
below 300—only because the curricular pace increased.  
Figure 9: A curricular pace that moves much faster than actual learning possible with 
the available PPF results in much lower learning 
 
 
Source: Authors’ simulations  
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The mechanics of this are simple. If the PPF shifts from grade to grade by more than the 
actual distribution of student learning from year to year, then more and more students are 
left behind because they learn little or nothing in a given year. In the next year, given that 
they are even further behind, from having learned so little, they learn less (or nothing). If the 
curricular pace is faster still, then even the average student gets left behind. When the pace is 
very fast compared to the PPF then everyone eventually gets left behind.  
We can simulate learning grade to grade with exactly the same PPF and exactly the same 
distribution of student initial skill —with the only change being curricular pace of 60, 70, 80 
or 90.  
Figure 10 shows the results of the fraction of students not learning anything by grade. At 
curricular pace of 60, almost no one stops learning before grade 8. But if the curricular pace 
increases to only 70, 20 percent of students learn nothing by grade 8, as they have fallen 
outside of the range of the PPF. Further increases in the curricular pace cause increasingly 
rapid rises in the fraction of students not learning; at CP=80, only 20 percent are learning 
anything in grade 8, and at CP=90 essentially no one learns anything past grade 6.  
 
Figure 11 shows the resulting learning profiles from these same simulations. By construction, 
CP=60 produces a fairly smooth pace of actual learning and in grade 8 the average score is  
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500.13 If the curriculum is more ambitious and CP=80, then average learning in grade 8 falls 
to 338—intuitively because more and more students are further and further from where the 
PPF says the most learning happens. By the time CP=90, the learning profile is essentially 
flat from fifth grade on as the curriculum has moved so far beyond student skill.  
 
All of the elements of the simulation are illustrated in Figure 12, which is a complex graph to 
understand, but the investment is worthwhile, as understanding Figure 12 will change your 
life.  
The PPF at the overambitious curricular pace=90 is illustrated for grades 5 and 8. This is a 
triangle with height 66 (maximum learning per year) and width of 330 that is centered on 460 
(average skill) in grade 5 (460=100+90*(5-1)), and centered on 727 in grade 8 
(730=100+90*(8-1)), so PPF5(66,ST,330,458) and PPF8(66,ST,330,727). The line of 
curricular pace when CP=90 in Figure 12 shows the evolution of the center of the PPFN 
across grades.  
                                                      
13 The average learning per year actually falls gradually because the standard deviation of student learning 
increases (as is realistic) and since actual learning is a weighted average of the PPF where the weights are the 
student population this means more of the triangle has students in it (that is, the typical student is further from 
the mean—which is what “standard deviation” means) and hence the average of the same PPF falls.    
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The entire distribution of actual student skill that results from the sequence of learning in 
each grade from the PPFs advancing at CP=90 is shown for grades 5 and 8. The actual 
learning profile (ALP) of the average is just the line plotting the means of those distributions 
(this is labeled ALP(60,90) as it is the learning profile when the “achievable” learning in 
grade 1 is 60 with a centered PPF but the curricular pace is 90). This is the same learning 
profile as that shown in two dimensions in Figure 11, flattening out around grade 5 and 
leading to a grade 8 score of only 279.14  
 
The advantage of the showing the z dimension is that we can also show the probability 
distribution of student skill levels.15 Comparing the PPF with the distribution of student 
learning, we can see that more than half of students in grade 5 are at a skill level where the 
learning from the PPF is zero, as looking at the distribution of grade 5 the peak is roughly 
                                                      
14 Also, figure 9 is just a two dimensional compression, a projection onto the y-z plane (or, Figure 9 is what 
you would see from a distance looking in the x direction standing on the y-axis).  
15 Since we cannot have two z-axes, the shapes of the probability distributions are re-scaled to the z-axis by 
making their maximum point of the assumed normal distribution in grade 1 equal to the height of the PPF.  The 
actual distribution shown does not have the shape of a normal distribution, as the repeated multiplicative 
application of a triangular learning function to a initially normal distribution cannot mathematically produce a 
normal distribution.  
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over where the PPF (the triangle) hits zero. This is the same fraction not learning as shown 
in Figure 10 for the line CP=90 at grade 5. By grade 8, the PPF (the triangle) and the actual 
distribution of student skill (the histogram) do not overlap, meaning no one learns anything 
and the learning profile is therefore completely flat.  
Figure 12 also shows the potential learning profile (PLP) if the PPFs are more centered, 
which is the actual learning profile when the curricular pace=60 (so 
PPFN(66,ST,330,100+60*(N-1))) and is labeled PLP(60,60). This learning profile reaches a 
score of 500 in grade 8. All of the deviation between the potential learning profile and the 
actual learning profile—and hence all of the gap between students who reach 500 on average 
and students who only reach 279 in grade 8 --is because of the accelerated pace of the 
curriculum. 
Other features of the simulation  
We have shown that a simple simulation model of accelerated curricular pace can generate 
huge differences in learning outcomes even if students start at exactly the same place and even 
if the potential of learning is exactly the same. We do not argue that these are exactly the same 
across countries. Because of cumulative nutritional insults or lack of early stimulation 
children or negative stimulation due to stress, children from different backgrounds could 
begin formal schooling less school ready. Moreover, due to lack of inputs of all types—from 
learning materials to poorly constructed classrooms to less knowledgeable teachers—the 
potential pedagogical function could be lower in some countries than others. These 
differences exist and interact with curricular pace in ways that reinforce each other. Two 
quick illustrations. 
 Low(er) initial skill combined with accelerated pace: first, if the students arrive at first grade with, 
on average, a lower level of skill, which in this case could be called “school readiness,” then 
the problems of an overambitious curriculum are exacerbated as more students are left 
behind, sooner. Table 5 shows the results of doing exactly the same simulations as above, 
changing only the initial skill or school preparedness level from 100 down to 80 or to 60. 
Even using the same curricular place of 60 (PPF height of 66), but starting 20 or 40 initial 
skill points behind 100, results in the simulations in a grade 8 cumulative learning 80 points 
or over 200 points lower. The problem of accelerated pace is exacerbated earlier—so that 
even small increases in the curricular pace cause large falls in cumulated learning outcomes. 
For example, for students that start with skill levels of 60, even just shifting the curricular 
pace from 60 to 70 causes a 32 percent drop in grade 8 scores. So the combined effect of lower 
initial skill levels with an inappropriately accelerated curriculum is much larger than just the 
low skill level alone.  
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Table 5: Students lack of “school readiness” exacerbates the problems of 
overambitious curricula as even small increases in curricular pace produce large falls 
in learning  
Curricular 
Pace (CP) 
Initial average skill level of grade 1 students  
100 (base case)  80  60 
Grade 8 
learning 
achievement 
Percentage 
fall due to 
raising CP  
Grade 8 
learning 
achievement  
Percentage 
fall due to 
raising CP 
Grade 8 
learning 
achievement
Percentage 
fall due to 
raising CP 
60 (Centered 
instruction) 
501    417   287   
70 447  11 328 21 217  24
80 337  25 255 22 180  17
90 279  17 218 15 160  11
100 248  11 198 9 147  8
Source: Authors’ simulations using PPFN(66,ST,330,100+CP*(N-1) and initial student skill 
distribution of mean 100,80, or 60, standard deviation 20. 
 
Low(er) educational potential combined with not decelerating pace: second, countries also could have 
different potential pedagogical functions—not be able to teach as much per year or have 
fewer resources, even when aligned. Our point is that this interacts with curricular pace, so 
that countries with lower PPF are obviously capable only of producing lower cumulative 
outcomes, but maintaining an overambitious curricular pace makes those losses much worse 
than they need to be. For instance, suppose the maximum learning gain per year (or the 
height of the triangle in the PPF) shifts downward by 10 points, from 66 to 56 (and gets 
correspondingly narrowed to maintain the same shape of width=5*height). If simultaneously 
the curriculum also slows by 10 points per year, then as shown in Table 6, the loss is roughly 
70 points by grade 8 from 500 to 433. But if the curriculum does not slow then there is an 
additional 50 points of loss, from the achievable 433 to 381. So the combined effect of lower 
school quality without slowing curricular pace is much larger than just the lower quality. 
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Table 6: Losses from lower potential combines with inappropriate curricular pace to 
produce even greater losses in learning 
Curricular 
Pace 
Grade 8 score 
with height of 
66 
Grade 8 score 
with height of 
56 
Losses 
50  483  433  Loss from just lower PPF when curricular 
pace is allowed to slow to 50= 67 (500-433) 
60  500  381  Combined learning loss from lower PPF 
and not slowing curricular pace by staying 
at 60= 119 (500-381) 
  Loss from not slowing the curricular 
pace when actual pace of learning 
slows=52 (433-381) 
Source: Authors’ simulations 
 
Understanding the empirical evidence on learning 
To this point we have shown that if the curricular pace is too fast, this can cause flat learning 
profiles and low cumulative attainment, even if all the other conditions for learning are 
present. This is not, in and of itself, evidence that an excessive rapid curricular pace is in fact 
the cause of low learning attainment in any given context. In this section we argue that 
evidence from experimental and non-experimental studies are consistent with a large 
curricular pace mismatch. 
The best evidence that there is a large mismatch between curricula and actual student ability 
is that there just is. That is, whenever countries test mastery of the curriculum, the typical 
student fares badly, often very badly. As in the Pakistan case cited above, the typical student 
is “three to four years” behind the curriculum – by the end of the third grade, only a small 
majority had mastered the first grade mathematics and language competencies expected of 
them (Das, Pandey, & Zajonc, 2006). Or the Uwezo study in Tanzania found that while 
multiplication is a key component of the grade 2 curriculum, only eight percent of grade 2 
students could multiply, and over half could not yet add. Even by grade 7, 32 percent of 
children could not multiply. Progress was similar in reading – of children completing grade 
7, only half could read a grade 2-level story in English (Uwezo, 2011). These are just 
examples to illustrate that all of the evidence that students are far behind the curriculum is at 
the same time evidence that, if teachers are teaching the curriculum, they are teaching at a 
level far above actual student ability.  
In this section we show that the single concept of a curricular gap, induced by an excess of 
curricular pace over actual learning progress, helps unify and understand a large number of 
recently emerging findings about learning. Our simple simulation model, that adds some 
realism to a description of learning and one new “parameter”—the curricular gap—to the 
formalization of “education quality,” can easily replicate many otherwise puzzling findings.   
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As emphasized above, we are not creating new evidence; rather we are using a simple formal 
representation of a learning function to encompass the evidence and concepts already 
suggested by other economists, educationists and practitioners such as Banerji (2000), 
Glewwe, Kremer and Moulin (2009), Banerjee and Duflo (2011), and Crouch and Korda 
(2009). The primary themes highlighted in their research are (a) curricula and in turn 
teaching are overambitious and cater to the higher-ability rather than the average students, in 
part because many systems were designed to cater to an elite class of students; (b) teachers’ 
incentives often support the most advanced students since teachers are evaluated on their 
ability to teach the prescribed, overly-ambitious curriculum; and (c) students passed from 
grade to grade, despite not learning, receive little remediation to catch up, and thus the 
proportion of students who lag behind grows as grades progress.    
“Production function” studies—providing more inputs  
The “curricular gap” adds a twist to understanding the voluminous empirical work 
estimating the “education production functions” that estimate the relationship between 
measured learning outcomes and schooling inputs. The puzzle that emerges from this 
literature is that, even when inputs are very low and hence we would expect an expansion of 
inputs to produce large learning gains, many empirical studies find surprisingly small impacts 
of expanded inputs (e.g. (Hanushek, 1986; Glewwe, Hanushek, Humpage, & Ravina, 2011; 
Kremer M. R., 1995).16 Even experimental evidence of the learning impact of the availability 
of new budget controlled at the school level for inputs in India finds very modest impacts 
(Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2011). 
How much would we expect learning to increase from an increased application of inputs 
(e.g., from more textbooks, better classrooms, better trained teachers, smaller class sizes, 
etc.)? A crude “chain rule” is that the change in learning will be the change in inputs times 
how much inputs raise the height of the PPF times how much the height of the PPF raises 
learning (equation 3).  
   .3 	∆            
∆        
∆    
∆ 
∆       ∆       
The first term comes directly from the PPF (expected learning gain per year); and for the 
symmetrical triangular PPF, the derivative of learning with respect to the height of the PPF 
is specific to each student (Eq. 4) as it depends on the gap between the initial skill level of 
the student and the center of the PPF.17 In this special case of a symmetrical triangular PPF, 
                                                      
16 This literature often hinges on which impacts are “statistically significant” which is really not the issue, the 
real issue is the magnitude of the learning impacts of inputs for which “statistical significance” is only a proxy as 
the relationship between magnitudes and statistical significance depends on the precision with which the impacts 
are measured.  
17 This formula is specific to one functional form of the PPF, but the general notion that the learning gain 
depends on the distance is common.  
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the learning a student gains from a given increase in the height of the PPF declines linearly. 
The gap between student initial skill and the center of the PPF, with a slope that depends on 
how steep the PPF is (how quickly the relevance of the material declines), in turn depends 
on the width, or range, of the triangular PPF.  
  .4 	
    ,  , ,       
      
 0 	     	 |      |  
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Intuitively, if |si-c|=0 then the learning gain per gain in PPF height equals one—if the 
learning gain increases by 10 points per year at the maximum gain due to more books, better 
teachers, then the student on whom the instruction is centered gains 10 points. Also 
intuitively students who are too far behind or too far ahead gain nothing. 
Figure 13 illustrates the decline in student learning for the width used in our simulations 
(330). A student 100 points (an OECD grade 8 student standard deviation on a 
PISA/TIMSS like instrument) from the center of the PPF would learn only 40 percent as 
much as the student for which the location of the PPF was ideal.  
Figure 13: The gain to a student from an improvement in quality depends on the 
student skill relative to the center of the PPF (illustrated for PPF(66,ST,330,c) 
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Many discussions of the “quality of education” treat “quality” exclusively as the height of the 
potential pedagogical function—what would make for greater capacity for learning—without 
the extra parameters of the shape, width/range, and centering. Considering height alone 
assumes that every student learns the same from a year’s instruction (or that learning is a 
function only of student “ability”). A function that produces uniform learning per year is a is 
a special case, one that would only be a useful approximation to our more complete 
representation of the PPF if (a) the width/range of the distribution of student ability is 
narrow compared to the range of the PPF, (b) the PPF is not very steep near the actual 
student skill and (c) the PPF is centered on student ability. However, in many settings none 
of those things is true.  
Making explicit the idea of a “curricular gap” affects the interpretation of all of the empirical 
literature relating inputs to learning. One interpretation of the low association in the USA as 
documented first by Coleman (1966) and emphasized by Hanushek (1986, 1995)—and 
extended to cross-national data by Gundlach, Woessmann and Gmelin (2001) —is that at 
high levels of spending the marginal product of additional resources on increasing the height 
of the PPF was small. However, it is hard to believe the marginal product is low in poor 
countries, like India, Pakistan and Tanzania, where non-teaching inputs are low. Another 
interpretation is that the efficacy with which resources are used is low.  
Kremer (2003) proposes a curricular gap as one explanation of low impact of budget 
resources on learning: “[g]iven the existing education system in Kenya, which like many 
developing countries has a curriculum focused on the strongest students, limited teacher 
incentives, and suboptimal budget allocation, simply providing more resources may have a 
limited impact on school quality.” Similarly, Banerjee and Duflo (2011) observe, “[b]ecause 
in many developing countries, both the curriculum and the teaching are designed for the elite 
rather than for the regular children who attend school, attempts to improve the functioning 
of the schools by providing extra inputs have generally been disappointing.”    
Our simulation model formalizes this argument. We show a curricular gap adds an additional 
term to the empirically estimated marginal product in equation 2. Even if spending raises the 
potential learning is increased substantially if the PPF is not centered on actual student ability 
this will produce little increase learning. An obvious promising next step in this research 
would be to combine the usual meta-analysis of impacts of inputs (e.g. class size, budgets) 
with measures of the curricular gap.  
Heterogeneous impact of inputs by initial ability  
In a very influential study using RCT (randomized control trial) methods, Glewwe, Kremer 
and Moulin (2009) estimated the impact of providing additional standard government 
textbooks to grades 3-7 in English and math in 1996,18 in 25 randomly chosen schools, with 
                                                      
18 Notice the 13 year lag between the experiment and final publication of the academic paper, which 
explains how the paper has been so influential in spite of being recently published.      
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100 schools used as controls and other interventions.19 The empirical finding that first 
emerged was that textbooks had absolutely no impact on the learning of the average student. 
This was stunning because it put rigorous research methods squarely at odds with the widely 
accepted conventional wisdom.  
Only gradually did the resolution of the puzzle emerge. Looking at the learning impact of 
additional textbooks across students’ initial performance before receiving the textbooks, the 
researchers realized that textbooks had a statistically significant impact; but only on students 
in the upper quintile of scores before the extra textbooks were provided.20 The most 
persuasive explanation for this heterogeneous treatment effect was that most children had 
trouble even reading the textbooks, which were in English, often a third language for 
students in this area of western Kenya. The authors used the curricular gap to explain the 
results: “The finding that provision of Kenya’s official government textbooks increased test 
scores only for above average students is arguably part of a much larger mismatch between 
the official curriculum and the needs of many students… In many developing countries— 
where students and teachers are frequently absent and scores on international standardized 
tests are very low—using curricula and textbooks that cover material at the same pace as in 
the developed world and assume that students know material from previous grade levels 
yields a serious mismatch.”  
Our formal model of uncentered instruction can generate simulated results with exactly this 
differential learning gain from improving the quality of inputs. Table 7 reports the results of 
increasing the height of the PPF in grade 4 by 10 points per year from our base case level of 
66 to 76. The impact of this improvement, and on which students, depends on the curricular 
gap. If the CP=60, the learning of students initially in quintile I and quintile V is roughly 
equal. But if CP=80, exactly the same change in the PPF produces an effect size gain of only 0.05 
for quintile I learners but 0.21 for quintile V learners.  
 
 
 
                                                      
19 Here we say additional since in grades 3, 4 and 5, 1 in 6 students had English and math textbooks. All 
English and math books were provided in early 1996, except for math texts for grades 4 and 6, which were 
provided in early 1997. In 1997, 25 more schools out of the 75 controls received grants, 43 percent of which was 
spent on textbooks. The other 50 controls received grants in two cohorts of 25 schools each, in 1998 and 2000. 
20 The “effect sizes” (gain as a fraction of a student standard deviation) for the students in the fourth and 
fifth quintiles after one year of exposure were 0.14 and 0.22 , significant at the 10 percent and 5 percent 
significance levels, respectively.  
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Table 7: As curricular pace increases relative to the PPF, the impact of improving 
quality in upper grades is more concentrated on the better students  
Curricular 
pace 
Simulated effect size (learning gain as fraction of student standard deviation) of raising 
PPF in grade 4 by 10 points  
 
 Quintile  I 
(worst) 
Quintile II  Quintile 
III 
Quintile IV  Quintile V 
(best) 
 
60  0.26 0.35  0.34  0.34  0.33 
70  0.12 0.21  0.25  0.27  0.28 
80  0.05  0.12 0.17  0.19  0.21 
90  0.00 0.05  0.09  0.11  0.14 
100  0.00 0.00  0.03  0.05  0.08 
Source: Authors’ simulations, base case is PPFN(66,ST,330,100+CP*(N-1)) 
Figure 14 shows how quality improvements have differential impacts depending on initial 
student skill.21 The top panel of Figure 14 shows a massive increase in the “quality of 
schooling” as the height of the PPF increases by 50 points. If this is centered on actual 
student ability, the gain to quintile I and quintile V students is exactly the same, 38 points 
(due to the assumed symmetry of the PPF). Exactly the same improvement in the “quality of 
education”--increasing the PPF by 50 points at its maximum--has different, and 
differentiated, effects if the curriculum is too hard for some students. We simulated grade 4 
in which the pace of the curriculum was 30 points faster since grade 1 (90 per year versus 
60), so the PPF is shifted right by a cumulative 90 points. In this case, there is almost no 
impact on the weaker students. Quintile I gains just 11 points, while quintile V students get 
roughly the same impact as the quintile V students in the slower pace scenario above (34 
points). But in this scenario they gain less than the possible maximum because they are 
behind, not ahead of the teaching.  
                                                      
21 The difference between this figure and figure 7 is that figure 14 shows the impact of quality 
improvements like inputs, ie raising the height of the triangle; while figure 7 shows the difference in learning 
when the level of instruction is centered or not. Figure 14 demonstrates that inputs don’t do much in an 
environment in which instruction isn’t centered, such as in figure 7b.   
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Figure 14: Exactly the same improvement in the “quality of education” has different 
impacts depending on how centered the curriculum is on actual student skill—with 
uncentered curriculum the advanced students benefit disproportionately  
 
Impact of inputs across different contexts 
The second implication of a curricular gap is that estimates of the impacts of changing the 
inputs—or even the PPF – will only be comparable across countries or educational settings 
with an equal (or similar) curricular gap. This is true irrespective of how rigorously estimated 
the learning impact is estimated. That is, suppose we did an unimpeachably rigorous 
experiment that raised inputs. Suppose we found that in context A the inputs raised scores 
by an effect size of 0.2 (20 points with a student standard deviation of 100). What we would 
know about the impact of raising inputs by exactly the same amount in context B? Even if 
we knew that inputs would raise the PPF by a similar amount, we still would not know the 
impact in context B, unless we knew that the curricular gap in context A and context B were 
the same.   
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Figure 15 shows the results of doing exactly the same thing, that is, raising the PPF by 10 points 
(from 66 to 76) across grades and across curricular paces, which mimics any “input” increase 
that raised the PPF, as was done in table 5. The figure reveals two differences.  
First, exactly the same experiment in grade 4 could produce an effect size of 0.31 (which is 
massive by the standards of the literature or an effect size of 0.14 (still pretty substantial, but 
only half as large) or 0.03 (which, depending on statistical power, might not even be 
statistically significant). All three of these estimates, although differing by an order of magnitude 
would each be the exactly correct estimate of the causal impact of raising the PPF by 10 
points in grade 4 with the same underling PPF. But clearly extrapolating the results from a 
context where curricular pace matches actual learning to another where it is accelerated 
produces completely erroneous estimates. Estimates of the impact of interventions that raise 
potential learning have no external validity when there is variation across contexts in the 
curricular gap.  
 
 
Source: Authors’ simulations  
For instance, results on the impact of “class size” seem to differ substantially, even among 
“well-identified” estimates. For instance, there are experimental estimates of the impact of 
class size from the STAR experiment in Tennessee and estimates from Israel with class size 
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effects identified off exogenous variation due to a class size rule both of which show 
substantial impacts--at least on some student populations.22 In contrast the class size effect 
from experiments in Kenya (Duflo, Dupas, & Kremer, 2012) and India (Banerjee, Duflo, 
Cole, & Linden, 2007) finds the impacts indistinguishable from zero.23 Again, there are many 
potential explanations for why even the experimental estimates vary so widely since these 
experiments took place in a wide variety of contexts, but varying curricular gaps are one 
possible explanation as decreasing class size does nothing if students were not learning 
anything anyway. Only with independent measures of the curricular gap matched to the 
evidence about impacts can this be validated.  
Early remediation and tracking: narrowing the curricular gap 
Accounting for the difference between the pace of learning and the curricular pace, or the 
curricular gap, also potentially explains why non-standard approaches to learning, such as 
remediation and tracking, can be successful. These approaches either shift the curricular pace 
down a notch to better coincide with students’ learning potential (as is usually the case with 
tracking or training teachers in remedial pedagogy), or they accelerate the pace of student 
learning, usually through more targeted attention or tutoring, such that students can better 
keep up with curricular pace. Below we highlight several examples of narrowing the 
curricular gap in India and Kenya. Again, we are not presenting this as “evidence” for our 
simulation model, rather we are showing our simple simulation model can replicate 
analytically these experiences.  
Pratham experiences in (early) remediation  
Recognizing that government teachers face incentives to pass students to the next grade and 
follow a curriculum that may be too challenging for many students (Banerji, 2000), the 
Indian NGO Pratham has complemented standard lessons with a variety of remedial 
support and community engagement projects. Pratham is not only unique in its approach to 
education, but also in its willingness to experiment with project variations in cooperation 
with researchers in ways that produce rigorous evidence about impact. Here we describe 
                                                      
22 This is not meant as a review of the literature on class size as there are also estimates with equally 
plausible identification strategies that find little or no class size effect in the USA e.g. (Hoxby, 2000) and for other 
OECD countries, e.g. (Woessmann & West, 2006).  We are just using the positive findings to illustrate variation 
across countries in the estimates that are widely accepted as “well-identified.”  That is, some difference in the 
estimates of “production” function impacts could be due to econometric issues that would lead estimates to not 
be consistent for causal impacts, but we show that even the “true” estimates that were perfectly estimated would 
differ systematically with the curricular gap.  
23 The regression estimate of receiving an extra teacher on scores of children 18 months later (a year after 
exposure) in Kenya was an effect size of 0.029 (table 5, column 1).  In the balsakhi experiment the implicit class 
size impact,, or the effect of students who were not exposed to a balsakhi was also near zero (the 95% confidence 
interval ranged from -0.076 to 0.189).  
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results from several Pratham interventions, offering explanations of success or failure by 
looking at how they affect the curricular gap. 24  
One pioneering in-school remediation initiative by Pratham involved employing a 
community teacher, called a balsakhi, to provide lessons to a group of 15-20 students in 
grades 3 and 4, identified as low achieving, for about half the school day.25 In nearly 200 
schools, balsakhis covered fundamental concepts taught in grades 1 and 2, such as numeracy 
and literacy. The program successfully lowered the curricular gap buy making it easier for 
students with initially low ability to be able to master key components of the curriculum. 
Students saw a 0.14 standard deviation improvement in test scores (averaged across language 
and math) in the first year and a 0.28 standard deviation improvement in the second year, 
with greatest gains shown by children in the bottom third of the initial distribution (0.43 
standard deviations).26 Although they declined, test scores for the bottom third of students 
remained higher and significant one year after the program ended (0.10 standard deviations) 
(Banerjee, Duflo, Cole, & Linden, 2007). 
Pratham also piloted an out-of-school remediation program aimed at reading and arithmetic 
fundamentals, and promoting community engagement in learning. Pratham staff recruited 
and trained village-level volunteers to teach low-performing students reading (at “reading 
camps”), combined with a) disseminating information about community rights and 
responsibilities regarding education; and b) community training on how to assess student 
reading and arithmetic levels, and produce a village report card. Volunteer tutoring was the 
only intervention that improved learning: of children who attended the reading camps, they 
were 22 percent more likely to be able to read at least letters, and 23 percent more likely to 
be able to read at least a word or paragraph.27 This experience demonstrates that lowering 
the curricular gap need not even be very challenging. Village volunteer tutors were trained 
for a mere four days and as a result, could offer children fundamental skills required for 
them to succeed in school (Banerjee, Banerji , Duflo, Glennerster, & Khemani, 2010). 
In addition to adding remedial personnel such as a balsakhi, Pratham experimented with 
encouraging government teachers to use Pratham’s back-to-basics approach through 
                                                      
24 All of these interventions were part of Read India, Pratham’s leading education program that supports 
rural primary school children in grades 1-5 in reading and math. 
25 Some classes received the balsakhi for two years and others for one, allowing authors to see if effects 
differed over time. They also tested students a year after the balsakhi program was finished.  
26 Results control for baseline test scores. Note that test gains for the bottom third are likely due to the fact 
that the bottom third of students were most likely to be assigned to a balsakhi. When looking just at children who 
received a balsakhi (rather than the average effect across students), authors estimate gains to be 0.6 standard 
deviations. There was no gain to the higher-achieving students not receiving a balsakhi, who might have 
benefitted due to smaller class sizes when peers were dismissed for tutoring.  
27 These results are conditional on participating, which was not random. At the village level, children who 
could not read at the outset were eight percent more likely to be able to read at least letters, but no more likely to 
read paragraphs or stories. Children who at the outset could read letters were four percent more likely to read at 
least paragraphs or words and three percent more likely to read stories.   
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training, distributing pedagogy materials, a remedial summer camp, and training local 
volunteers to tutor students in remedial material inside and outside of school, in the states of 
Bihar and Uttarakhand. The in-school interventions targeted at the average teacher were 
intended to slow the curricular pace – to ensure that children mastered key concepts in math 
and reading before moving onto more advanced lessons. These had the most modest 
impacts. Distributing materials alone had no effect. Training teachers was less effective than 
training teachers combined with providing volunteer tutors, which raised reading fluency 
scores by 0.13 standard deviations and math scores by 0.05 points after two years in Bihar.28 
The authors suggest that the greater success in Bihar may have been because in Bihar 
volunteers met with children after school whereas in Uttarakhand, tutors worked in 
classrooms supporting teachers, where they supplemented teachers’ customary work (or 
even substituted for teachers), which involved adhering to the standard curriculum.29  
While the in-school interventions targeted at the average teacher did not have much traction, 
a similar intervention with the same type of teachers did. Although implementers faced some 
challenges with targeting,30 a month-long summer camp in which government teachers31 
taught low performing children in grades 3-5 for four hours a day improved reading levels, 
especially for those attending. A child attending on average gained over half a level in 
reading (out of five levels) in just a month (Banerjee, Duflo, & Walton, 2011). 
How do the Pratham experiences help explain low learning levels? There are three distinct, 
but non-mutually exclusive, possibilities. One explanation is that low performing students 
are incapable of learning; which has been consistently refuted since the Pratham experiences 
as a whole demonstrate that learning levels of lagging students can be improved, often quite 
quickly.  
A second possibility is that the PPF is just low inside government schools due to the quality 
of inputs and/or motivation of teachers. We know that teaching quality, at least with basic 
literacy and numeracy, is unlikely lagging since results suggest that teaching students 
fundamentals is not hard. Volunteers with motivation but very little formal training can be 
quite effective in remediating early learning gaps and improving reading and mathematics 
levels. The Bihar experience proves that that the existing government teachers can do what 
the volunteers with a few days training are capable of doing, if they were a) as motivated as 
                                                      
28 Increase in ‘scores’ for ASER data indicates a fraction of a reading or math level. In addition to reading 
fluency, ASER reading scores (separate test) increased by 0.12 SD. Math results above are ASER oral. Similar 
results were found for written Hindi (0.14 SD) and math (0.1 SD) tests. For children who could take written tests 
in grades 3-5, the training+materials+volunteers intervention showed an increase of 0.12 SD for Hindi and 0.14 
for math. This indicates that higher-achieving children also benefited from the interventions.  
29 The lower success in Uttarakhand could also have to do with higher baseline learning levels than in Bihar, 
and greater institutional support for the program in Bihar.   
30 74 percent of the children who attended the summer camp were in grades 3-5, but only 39 percent were 
in the "low-performing" target group, defined as being in the ASER word level 3 or below.  
31 Participants were mostly teachers newly-appointed by the local government Note these local panchayat 
teachers are government teachers, different from “state” teachers, who are paid much more.   
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locally hired volunteer teachers, and/or b) if they are not under intense pressure to follow 
the prescribed syllabus. There are clearly elements of both. But a key part of the question is 
whether government teachers are  motivated and do attempt to teach the curriculum, 
irrespective of whether students are capable of absorbing that material, or whether they just 
are not motivated to do anything. The fact that government teachers were able to 
accomplish learning gains in Bihar in a summer camp (in which they were freed from the 
usual constraints of teaching the curriculum) but did not produce similar gains during the 
school year suggests that, as Banerji (2000) writes, “A teacher might be aware that some 
children in her class have serious difficulties with basic arithmetic concepts that the 
competency level of these children (sometimes 20 to 30 per cent of a class) is well below the 
prescribed curriculum for that grade level…Most primary school teachers take the least risky 
route of concentrating on those children who perform at grade level and can cope with the 
syllabus.”  
The third explanation is that the curriculum moves too fast relative to learning and quickly 
becomes nearly irrelevant to the skills of the average student. What remediation does is re-
center instruction onto actual ability levels. 
Our simple simulation model can easily reproduce the kinds of impact seen from 
remediation in the face of uncentered instruction. Figure 16 shows how large variation in 
PPFs could affect whether students of a particular initial skill level learn. A curriculum 
catering to the bottom 40 percent of students would be centered over an average skill level 
of 251 (red PPF), whereas a curriculum centered on the entire grade 4 distribution would be 
at 278, and an accelerated, overambitious curriculum (with a pace of 90) would be centered 
on an average student skill of 362 (blue PPF). In an overambitious environment, on the 
increment to student learning for the bottom 40 percent of students is only 21 points, which 
is why exposing them to lessons centered on their skill level for even half the time can yield 
remarkable learning gains.   
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Figure 16: A PPF centered on the bottom 40 percent of students can result in large 
learning gains, especially in an environment with an overambitious curricular pace    
 
 
Similarly, Table 8 shows the results of using our basic simulation model to replicate the 
impact of remediation by assuming the bottom 40 percent of students are placed in a class 
with exactly the same PPF as a regular grade, except that it is centered on the actual average 
of those lower-performing students, rather than on the curriculum, for half the time. We 
calculate the “effect size” (learning as a fraction of student standard deviation) on students 
of that remediation in grades 3 and 4. With even modest curricular gap, the benefits of 
remediation are huge. At CP=80, the effect size on the bottom quintile is 0.5 effect sizes or 
higher and is 0.26 in grade 3 and 0.33 in grade 4—well into the range of gains of 0.43 for the 
bottom third. If there is no curricular gap (CP=60), then there is also no gain to remediation 
for quintile II students.  
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Table 8: Impact of remediation: the “effect size” of learning gains from children 
exposure to centered instruction 50 percent of the total instructional time 
Curricular Pace  Grade 3  Grade 4 
Quintile I  Quintile II  Quintile I  Quintile II 
60  0.19 -0.09  0.18 -0.12 
70  0.35 0.10  0.38 0.12 
80  0.50 0.26  0.55 0.33 
90  0.65 0.42  0.68 0.54 
100  0.81 0.59  0.70 0.70 
Source: Authors’ simulations. Relative to base case, 40 percent of students are exposed 50 
percent of the “regular” PPF and 50 percent of a remediated PPF   
Early grade reading assessment 
One puzzle is why effect sizes are so small when it seems there ought to be huge, easy gains 
when starting from low levels of performance. Given this puzzle, one ought to find that if 
the problem of curricular gap is addressed squarely, there are potentially very large learning 
gains. In the Early Grade Reading Assessment Plus (EGRA) in Liberia, which was subject to 
randomized evaluation, authors found learning two to three times faster in treatment than 
control schools and large effect sizes in oral reading and reading comprehension of 0.8 
(Korda & Piper , 2011).  
There is an increasing body of evidence from interventions that follow the “five Ts” (Time 
on task, teaching teachers, texts, tongue of instruction, and testing) in early intervention can 
produce massive results with demonstrated effect sizes of 0.4 to 0.8. The experiences include 
Breakthrough to Literacy in Zambia (USAID, 2011), Malandi District Experiment in Kenya 
(Crouch & Korda, 2009), Systematic Method for Reading Success (SRMS) (South Africa) (Piper, 
2009), and Read-Learn-Lead (RLL) (Mali) (Gove & Cvelich, 2011).32  
Tracking by skills/learning in early grades 
Tracking,33 or organizing students in different groups or classes by ability, has proven 
effective at promoting learning in some contexts (eg, see Figlio and Page 2002, Zimmer 
                                                      
32 Many thanks to Luis Crouch for these references and his guidance on EGRA and remediation.  
33 There are many variations on ability grouping in education. For the purposes of this paper, we use the 
term tracking to mean sorting pupils into different classrooms within schools based on ability, with pupils generally 
taking all subjects together. A more refined approach would involve ability grouping by subject (sometimes called 
“setting”), but we have not seen this tested in developing countries. We do not consider other types of tracking,  
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2003).34 Proponents argue that tracking brings efficiencies in instruction – less diversity in 
student ability in the classroom allows teachers to better tailor lessons to student needs. 
Critics in claim that tracking promotes inequality since lower-ability learners become 
entrenched in lower-ability tracks and miss out on benefits from learning with higher-ability 
peers (Slavin, 1990).35 Why might grouping students by ability in an environment with an 
overambitious curriculum improve learning? Duflo, Dupas and Kremer (2011) argue: “A 
central challenge of educational systems in developing countries is that students are 
extremely diverse, and the curriculum is largely not adapted to new learners. These results 
show that grouping students by preparedness or prior achievement and focusing the teaching 
material at a level pertinent for them could potentially have large positive effects with little or no 
additional resource cost” (emphasis added). 
The researchers compared schools in which classes were split based on ability verses 
randomly, allowing all students to benefit from smaller grade 1 and 2 classes. Because some 
students were placed in non-tracked, smaller classes, authors were able to attribute results to 
tracking versus class size reductions. Students across the achievement distribution benefited 
from being grouped by achievement, and effects persisted into grade 3 after children were 
re-joined into one class. Students in top half of distribution gained 0.19 standard deviations 
in test scores while students in the bottom half gained 0.16 standard deviations, controlling 
for baseline scores. 36 Not surprisingly, recalibrating lessons allowed students to excel in new 
material. Students in the lower half of the distribution demonstrated gains in easier questions 
or basic skills (perhaps because there was insufficient time to master fundamental and more 
advanced skills), while the upper half gained in more advanced skills or harder questions 
(perhaps because they already knew the basics).  
As with the other examples above, we cannot say conclusively that tracking in Kenya 
narrowed the curricular gap, but it seems plausible. The success of tracking depends on 
whether it shifts an overly-challenging syllabus to into the range of student learning potential 
– whether the PPF becomes more aligned with the distribution of student skill. Tracking 
would have little to no effect if the curricular and actual pace were already equal. However, 
                                                                                                                                                 
or the sorting of students into ability groups across schools or grades, which make it difficult for students to move 
once they have been selected to enter a certain group (also called “selective” as opposed to “comprehensive” 
schooling in the UK).  
34 Much of the tracking literature is suffers from identification problems because the research largely relies 
on studies that compare a) test score gains of students in different tracks within the same school, or b) tracked 
and un-tracked students of similar ability in different schools, without accounting for the fact that the presence of 
tracking in a school could affect school choice, and unobservable characteristics about the school that could 
affect test scores. The Duflo et al 2011 Kenya study described below is the first we know of to randomly assign 
schools to tracked and non-tracked status.   
35 In the USA, critics also claim that lower tracks receive fewer resources and are allocated lower quality 
teachers (Figlio & Page, 2002). 
36 Scores for students in tracking schools were 0.17 SD greater at the end of the program and persisted one 
later (controlling for baseline values and individual covariates). The fact that impact persisted suggests that in 
classes 1 and 2 students may have learned fundamental skills that they were able to apply in later grades.    
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tracking offers greatest benefits with an overambitious curriculum. Because tracking 
segregates higher and lower ability students in respective classes, teachers faced with a critical 
mass of students who cannot follow their lessons have little choice but slow down their 
curricular pace, and in turn the mass of students who end up learning nothing, as portrayed 
in figure 10, declines as more students can keep up with lessons in earlier years.37  
Gains from changes in school management that allow “centering” the 
curriculum 
In this section we look that the potential gains from private or community schools, or 
employing different types of teachers within public schools, with respect to how they 
structure curricula and syllabi. In no way are we advocating these approaches as universal 
superior mechanisms for achieving learning; but instead explaining their performance at least 
in part due how these mechanisms narrow the curricular gap.  
Private Schools 
Why could private schools better align learning potential with curricular pace? Banerji (2000) 
explains that it is private schools’ flexibility in adapting material to student ability. “Private 
schools do not follow the ‘all pass’ policy. Children who fail are kept back. Parents must seek 
remedial action outside the school. Through a heavy load of tests and reports, the school 
and parents ensure that a child does not fall behind.” 
The findings of a study in the Punjab province of Pakistan offer a similar explanation. This 
study demonstrates remarkable results from private schools, which make up 35 percent of 
primary school enrollment (Andrabi, Das, Khwaja, & Zajonc, 2011). Learning is deplorably 
low overall, but private schools are impressively less bad. In government schools, only 24 
percent of third graders could form a sentence in Urdu using the word “school” while 46 
percent of students in private schools could do so. There are massive differences in 
performance between private and public schools. Simple cross-section estimates find 
learning of third graders in private school higher by effect sizes of 0.91, 0.57, and 0.45 in 
English, Math and Urdu respectively. The sophisticated estimates of the private school 
impact suggest learning per year in private schools is higher by an effect size of around 0.3 
per year in each of these subjects. These are not “elite” private schools; these are mostly 
“mom and pop” small independent private schools that actually spend substantially less per 
student per year than government schools. In cost effectiveness—learning gain per year per 
rupee—private schools are factor multiples higher than government schools.38  
                                                      
37 For higher-achieving students, the benefit from tracking may come from being in the 
classroom with similar achieving peers, even if teachers do not modify lessons, since teachers are by 
default already catering lessons to these students.  
38 These findings are consistent with other estimates from developing countries that private 
schools can provide more learning at substantially lower cost.  Tooley and Dixon (2005) find students  
44 
 
The question is how the private school impact on learning can be so big when utilizing less 
resources and often using teachers at much lower wages, with less overall education and 
training as civil servant teachers. One obvious explanation is greater motivation and 
incentives of private schools, which leads to greater effort by teachers and school 
management. But, another possibility is that, while the government schools have a massive 
curricular gap, private schools can simply re-align the pace of instruction with actual student 
ability, and produce consistently much larger gains in learning and cumulative levels of skill. 
This realignment is often much easier for private schools and teachers to achieve, since they 
are frequently excused from the pressure of completing a single national curriculum, and 
may teach to a more homogeneous population in terms of ability.  
Again, similar to the tracking explanation above, it is not that private schools demonstrate 
universal efficacy – this depends on whether they narrow the curricular gap relative to the 
gap in public schools. For example, the Pakistan findings are in striking contrast to the 
results from evidence and experiments in the USA where the heated debate is whether the 
pure causal learning impact of private schools is just small or zero. No one is proposing 
learning gains on the order of a full student standard deviation—and certainly not with costs 
per pupil a third to a half lower.  
Community control of schools and/or teachers  
One recurrent debate in education is between “official” schools and “community” schools 
or “formal” and “informal” schools. This contrasts “regular” government schools with civil 
service teachers controlled by a state bureaucracy and hired according to “meritocratic” 
criteria like degrees and teacher training, with “community” schools that often utilize local 
teachers, without civil service status, often working on contract, and rely much more on 
community inputs, and are often (implicitly if not explicitly) outside of the control of the 
government schooling bureaucracy. 
Interestingly, in spite of having lower “quality” on most formal, input-based ratings, 
community controlled schools often perform as well, or better, on learning performance 
than regular schools. One possible reconciliation of this puzzle of “lower quality” leading to 
better outcomes is that when communities control schools, these schools teach to their 
students because accountability relationships are directly to the community and teachers do 
not have a commitment to the central curriculum. 
A major challenge in evaluating community schools is that they are often located in areas 
where government schools haven’t yet expanded due to remoteness or conflict or other 
reasons that might make it difficult for a centralized education bureaucracy to provide 
schooling. Chaudhury and Parajuli (2010) were able to get around this challenge by 
                                                                                                                                                 
in private unrecognized schools in Hyderabad ahead of government schools by 0.84 and 1.51 standard 
deviations in math and English respectively.  They also report private to government gaps between 0.3 
and 1.15 standard deviations in Ga, Ghana and Lagos State, Nigeria. Interestingly, in Nairobi they find 
very small gaps.   
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evaluating an initiative by the Government of Nepal to transfer school management 
responsibility from the Government to the community, allowing a school management 
committee, including parents and community members, to make staffing and financial 
decisions about the school, such as sending government-recruited teachers to return to 
district headquarters, to hire and fire community teachers, and to tie teacher salaries to 
performance.39 They find that community schools did no worse than government schools on 
grade 3 curriculum-based achievement tests (math and language), and demonstrated 
improved access and equity, measured by the fraction of out-of-school children, especially 
those from disadvantaged caste or ethnicity groups. Community schools also demonstrated 
improved grade progression and repetition rates.  
While utilizing locally-hired non-tenured teachers isn’t offering local control of the school, it 
is similar to community schools in the sense that such teachers are usually recruited and 
supervised by the community, often by through school-level committees. These teachers, 
who, for example, receive contracts that are renewed annually by the school committee, 
could improve learning in several ways. First, they are likely under less pressure than the 
typical civil-servant teacher to follow the curriculum and instead focus instruction that meets 
local, community demands. Thus they have more discretion over what they teach and are 
better positioned to teach to students’ ability, lowering the curricular gap. Second, they often 
come from the community and thus know the local context and student ability better, and 
are more attuned to student and community needs, thus further reinforcing community 
accountability. Third, locally-hired teachers may just work harder and show up to class more 
than civil servant teachers, as they could be dismissed due to absence or poor performance. 
This diligence in the classroom could lead to improved learning.  
Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2010) examine the impact of randomly assigning contract 
teachers to 100 public schools in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. Just as community 
managed schools did no worse than government schools in changing academic performance, 
the authors found that contract teachers did no worse in improving student learning than 
civil-service teachers (who are five times as expensive). And students in schools with an extra 
contract teacher performed better in mathematics and language tests by 0.15 and 0.13 
standard deviations, respectively, with the greatest gains (0.23 and 0.25 standard deviations) 
for schools in remote areas and grade 1 students.40  
What motivated the learning improvements in Andhra Pradesh? It was indeed the case that 
contract teachers were “only” absent 16.3 percent of the time compared to 26.8 percent for 
civil service teachers, averaged over two years; and contract teachers showed higher rates of 
                                                      
39 Conversion from government to community management was voluntary, so the researchers employed a 
strategy of encouraging communities through an advocacy campaign in randomly-chosen areas to convert to 
community management.  
40 It is possible that the contract teachers were more likely to be assigned to grade 1, since grade assignment 
was decided by the school. At least in the first year, contract teachers were more likely to be assigned to grades 1-
3 as opposed to grades 4-5.   
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teaching activity. But it seems implausible that an approximately 10 percentage point 
difference in attendance could be driving the lack of any difference in student learning 
between highly-trained and well-paid teachers and those that have little to no training, less 
schooling and much lower pay. The community accountability explanation, which the 
authors don’t test, remains possible – even if contract teachers are still absent some of the 
time, they may be more attentive to student needs as the community is monitoring and 
evaluating their performance. Or narrowing the curricular gap could offer a plausible 
explanation.  
Figure 17 demonstrates how a teacher with much lower skills could promote just as much 
learning as a better trained or educated colleague – it depends on where the respective 
teachers are targeting their lessons. The smaller blue PPF is centered on the average grade 5 
student (340) with a curricular pace of 60, whereas the red PPF is centered on an average 
student who can follow lessons with a pace of 90 (460). Although the height (maximum 
learning gain per year) and width (range of students for whom lesson is applicable) of the 
blue PPF are half that of the more accelerated red PPF, students learn more, or just as much, 
with the more modest curriculum since it is better tailored to student ability.  
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Figure 17: If community or contract teachers better center curricular pace on actual 
student skill, they can achieve the same learning gains as “better” teachers (e.g. 
higher PPF) but who are centered in the curriculum, not the student 
   
New interventions are underway that mix together community control, contract teachers, 
and a focus on early intervention and remediation. The Teacher’s Community Assistant 
Initiative (TCAI) in Ghana for instance combines all these elements into a single 
intervention. It is now being rigorously evaluated by the NGO Innovations for Poverty 
Action and will have results soon.41 
Conclusion  
This paper takes the results from a number of recent experiments and studies, and 
encompasses their findings in a simple parsimonious formal simulation model. To the 
standard discussions of education quality, we add the key question of the alignment of 
teaching and instructional materials and curricular objectives, with the ability of students. 
This based on the common sense notion that material can be either too easy or too hard, 
and students learn the most when instruction is tailored to students’ skill level. 
We show that if the curricular pace—the level and material teachers are expected to teach—
moves faster than actual student learning, this alone can generate enormous differences in 
cumulative learning. Calibrating a baseline model to reproduce typical OECD grade 8 results 
in internationally comparable assessments (e.g. PISA or TIMSS), we show that all of the 
observed learning differences between poor performing and OECD countries could  be 
                                                      
41 See http://www.poverty-action.org/remedialeducation/scalingup 
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accounted for only by an overly accelerated curriculum in poor countries – even if the 
countries have exactly the same potential learning. 
That is, the observed learning profiles (rates of learning per year of schooling completed) can 
be flat just because the material being taught to too hard for students as the curriculum has 
moved ahead, leaving students behind.  
 There is widespread evidence of a mismatch between curricula and student achievement—
essentially every curricular referenced assessment given shows that students actual 
performance is many grade levels behind what the curriculum says they should have 
mastered.  
If an educational system recognizes an existing large gap between curricular pace and actual 
learning, then the change from “business as usual” expansion of inputs is almost complete. 
  More focus on “inputs” is unlikely to have much impact—and may detract attention 
from the real problem for a very long time.  
  Efforts that “re-center” teaching on student actual skill/ability can have enormous 
pay-offs, whether through remediation (such as Pratham’s programs in India or 
Early Grade Reading Assessment Plus-like programs), private schools, community-
controlled schools, tracking, multi-grade teaching, or the adoption of other 
pedagogical reforms that allow teachers to focus on student mastery of basic skills. 
Our point is that these may or may not work in different contexts, depending on the 
extent of the curricular gap, and how much flexibility systems allow teachers and 
lessons to respond to it.  
  Re-centering curricula and in turn teaching could offer a low-cost solution to 
improving learning, if systems are willing to re-focus learning goals on the average 
learner. (We know they are able of remedial teaching from the Banerjee, Duflo and 
Walton 2011 India results.) 
  A focus on meeting early and achievable goals, rather than end of school high stakes 
for student examinations like university entrance exams, could re-orient teaching 
and learning away from what happens for a small elite towards the typical student, 
who is also then more equipped to move ahead. 
 
We are proposing that there are large gains in learning from actions that are near costless—
or even cost saving. Economists, ourselves included, are always (and often rightly) suspicious 
of “hundred dollar bills on the sidewalk”—if what we are saying is true, why haven’t others 
already noticed this and made the changes? This is an important argument and one which we 
address at length elsewhere. We believe that the answer is that existing school systems have 
gained legitimacy and internal and external support through “isomorphic mimicry” 
(Pritchett, Woolcock, & Andrews, 2010) in which schooling systems are rewarded for 
“looking like” good schools rather than actually promoting learning. In this context, systems 
are geared to process compliance and inputs and hence just are not equipped to officially 
“see” (in the sense of Scott 1998) the realities of learning. In the context in which looking  
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like good schools is rewarded, then each curriculum reform adds new skill sets and topics to 
be covered and helps with the camouflage of looking like functional or even “best practice” 
systems. Simplification or slowing down would look like failure—which is politically more 
salient than actually being a success-and hence systems actively resist “disruptive” 
(Christensen, 1997) innovations (like remedial teaching or contract teachers or radical 
revisions of the structure of classrooms around technology). The practical question is 
therefore how to sabotage the camouflage so that systems are motivated to adopt 
innovations, even ones that don’t necessarily look good.  
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